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Abstract 
Humans evolved in the context of intense intergroup competition, and groups comprised of loyal 
members more often succeeded than those that were not. Therefore, selective pressures have 
consistently sculpted human minds to be "tribal," and group loyalty and concomitant cognitive 
biases likely exist in all groups. Modern politics is one of the most salient forms of modern 
coalitional conflict and elicits substantial cognitive biases. Given the common evolutionary 
history of liberals and conservatives, there is little reason to expect pro-tribe biases to be higher 
on one side of the political spectrum than the other. We call this the evolutionarily plausible null 
hypothesis and recent research has supported it. In a recent meta-analysis, liberals and 
conservatives showed similar levels of partisan bias, and a number of pro-tribe cognitive 
tendencies often ascribed to conservatives (e.g., intolerance toward dissimilar others) have been 
found in similar degrees in liberals. We conclude that tribal bias is a natural and nearly 
ineradicable feature of human cognition, and that no group—not even one’s own—is immune. 
 Keywords: politics, bias, symmetry, tribal loyalty, intergroup conflict 
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Tribalism is Human Nature 
 The human mind was forged by the crucible of coalitional conflict (Geary, 2005). For 
many thousands of years, human tribes have competed against each other. Coalitions that were 
more cooperative and cohesive not only survived but also appropriated land and resources from 
other coalitions and therefore reproduced more prolifically, thus passing their genes (and their 
loyalty traits) to later generations (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). Because coalitional coordination 
and commitment were crucial to group success, tribes punished and ostracized defectors and 
rewarded loyal members with status and resources (as they continue to do today). Thus, displays 
of loyalty and commitment to other members of the tribe also enhanced individual-level fitness 
(by increasing status and resources and minimizing risks of ostracization). Over time, this would 
select for traits that signal and enhance coalitional commitment (Berreby, 2005) such as ingroup 
favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tribalism, therefore, is natural.1  
Tribal Bias 
Although tribal loyalties inspire many noble behaviors, they can impel humans to 
sacrifice sound reasoning and judgmental accuracy for group belonging and commitment 
(Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slavic, 2017). In other words, tribal loyalties can lead to tribal 
biases. For example, people selectively approach information that supports their tribe’s interests 
and avoid information that has potential to harm their tribe (by watching particular news 
networks, or by forming “echo chambers” in their social environments; Stroud, 2010). And 
people evaluate information they are exposed to in a biased manner by being uncritically 
                                               
1 By tribe, we simply mean a human social group sharing a common interest, and by tribalism, 
we mean tendencies to be loyal to and favorable toward one’s own tribe (and less favorable 
toward other tribes). By human nature or natural, we mean evolved human propensities that 
develop in most humans. 
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accepting of information that supports their tribe’s agenda and more skeptical of information that 
opposes it (Ditto et al., 2018). These kinds of cognitive biases are problematic because (1) 
post-enlightenment societies prize reason and rationality and no longer explicitly tolerate 
obvious displays of ingroup favoritism, and (2) modern governments require the coordination of 
multiple groups (e.g., political groups) to function. Biases decrease the likelihood of consensus 
as groups fail to agree even on the facts in a particular debate. 
There are at least two reasons tribalism distorts beliefs. First, beliefs display and signal 
loyalty to group goals. Asserted opinions at least partially function as behavioral intention 
indicators and therefore as coalitional membership indicators (Pietraszewski, Curry, Petersen, 
Cosmides, Tooby, 2015). When one asserts “Abortion is immoral,” one indicates willingness to 
coordinate with others to regulate abortion. Coalitions that generally oppose abortion (e.g., the 
modern GOP) react negatively toward putative members who assert skepticism about pro-life 
principles (Ditto & Mastronarde, 2009) because this indicates an unwillingness to cooperate on 
that goal. If beliefs are held fervently, compel strong emotional displays, or are costly to hold, 
they might function as honest (and thus trustworthy) loyalty signals (Kurzban & Christner, 
2011). Perhaps perversely, dogmatism and resilience to contrary evidence likely enhance the 
persuasiveness of the signal, because they show that one is strongly dedicated to the group’s 
ideology in spite of potential consequences (e.g., being wrong about a difficult to answer 
question). 
Second, beliefs are precursors to potential arguments that support the interests of the 
group, which coalitions are often formed to pursue and protect (e.g. wealthy people who want 
low tax rates). In modern societies, violence is verboten, so tribes prevail not by conquering 
other tribes, but by persuading other people—often, by making arguments. Sincere beliefs 
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generally lead to better and more zealous arguments than cynical hypocrisy (von Hippel & 
Trivers, 2011). Therefore, people are motivated to favor and believe information that promotes 
their group’s interests and to resist information that opposes their group’s interests because it 
makes them more persuasive proponents of their group’s cause (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & 
Braman, 2011). 
Political Bias 
These two reasons also likely explain why politics appears to be one of the most fertile 
grounds for bias (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Political contests are highly consequential 
because they determine how society will allocate coveted resources such as wealth, power, and 
prestige. Winners gain control of cultural narratives and the mechanisms of government and can 
use them to benefit their coalition, often at the expense of losers. Given these high stakes, 
motivations to signal group loyalty and to defend the positions of the group are likely 
particularly powerful in politics. 
Within the political domain, individuals appear most biased about those issues most 
important to the group, which often include moral commitments (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 
2009). As noted above, moral commitments signal that one is willing to conform to the rules of 
the coalition. Therefore, groups are particularly prone to giving status to those who conform to 
and vocalize support for moral norms and to deducting status from those who rebel and vocalize 
dissent against those norms (Descioli & Kurzban, 2013). Thus, we can expect tribal biases to be 
especially large for important moral commitments (Tetlock, 2002). For example, if opposing 
abortion is a central goal for the political right, conservatives will be particularly biased about 
facts surrounding abortion. If enhancing the status of women in society is a central moral goal of 
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the political left, liberals might be particularly biased about facts surrounding the gender wage 
gap. 
However, humans also care about truth and accuracy (for obvious evolutionary reasons), 
and so biases are most likely to emerge for issues where the truth is ambiguous (Munro, Weih, & 
Tsai, 2010). Many if not most political (and moral) disagreements are about ambiguous issues. 
Experts disagree about when a fetus or child can experience conscious pain and about the many 
contributors to the gender wage gap (and even the size of it). Even if experts could agree on the 
facts, political positions often reflect opinions about what ought to be the case (often subjective 
beliefs) based on beliefs about what is the case (ideally objective facts). For example, if the 
within-profession wage gap is largely due to women’s choices to work fewer hours, should they 
be paid the same as men? Policy choices often involve painful and complicated tradeoffs (e.g., 
interfering with free market autonomy to reduce income inequality, investing in new and more 
costly energy technology to minimize climate change). 
When the truth is ambiguous, tribal biases are more powerful because argument is more 
important than when the truth is clear. Groups do not debate whether trees exist because the 
answer is virtually undeniable. They do, however, debate whether fetuses deserve various legal 
protections or whether women are paid less than men for equal work, because there are 
intelligent arguments on both sides of these issues and there is no one obvious correct answer. 
There is an unfortunate tribal logic here. One might imagine that ambiguity would compel 
humility and confessions of uncertainty, but when ambiguity occurs in the context of coalitional 
conflict, it may actually increase epistemic arrogance and bias. This is perfectly sensible, 
however, if we remember that humans are coalitional animals, not dispassionate reasoners. They 
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were not “designed” to be humble; rather, they were “designed” to conform and to protect the 
status of their tribe (Kahan et al., 2017). 
Our guiding assumption, then, is that tribal bias is a nearly ineradicable element of human 
nature and that it causes predictable cognitive biases (those that benefit the self and the group). 
Specifically, people will be biased in favor of their tribe, particularly for issues important to the 
tribe (often moral issues) and particularly when ambiguity is high and therefore the importance 
of argument and persuasion is high. Given that modern liberals and conservatives share 
evolutionary histories that favor loyalty signals and tribal biases, it is a priori likely that the 
psychological propensities for bias would be similar on the political left and right. We call this 
the evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis and recent research has supported it. 
Everyone’s a Little Bit Biased… 
Social sciences for a long time focused especially on the biases of conservatives, with 
some scholars arguing that conservatives are more biased than liberals (e.g., Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).2 But in recent years, researchers have pushed back against this 
narrative, contending that the overwhelming preponderance of liberals in the social sciences may 
have skewed research about political ideologies and the people who hold them. Liberals likely 
see their own biases as truths (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002) and see conservative beliefs as 
peculiar and wrong; therefore, they seek to explain the “conservative mind” and its perplexing 
biases (Duarte et al., 2015; Eitan et al., 2019). 
This insight inspired Ditto and colleagues (2018) to conduct a meta-analysis to test these 
competing hypotheses. Across 51 experiments that tested the tendency for liberals and 
                                               
2 Likely all political tribes display group loyalty biases, but the majority of this work has been 
conducted in the U.S., so we focus on U.S. politics here. Future work should examine these 
patterns in other political systems. 
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conservatives to evaluate identical information more favorably when it supports their own 
political commitments than when it opposes them (for example, a death penalty supporter 
evaluating scientific methods as more valid when the results of those methods support rather than 
oppose the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty), there was strong support for the symmetry 
hypothesis: liberals and conservatives were both biased, and to virtually equal degrees. Because 
the included studies were performed under tightly controlled laboratory conditions, these results 
cannot tell us how liberal and conservative biases might vary over time and context, but they do 
suggest that liberals and conservatives share the same basic psychology that leads to bias—and 
to similar degrees. This finding is consistent with the evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis: 
tribal bias is natural, and thus all political tribes should be similarly susceptible to it. 
…Even liberals 
Whereas earlier scholars often emphasized that conservatives were higher in proclivities 
that ought to predict stronger biases (than liberals) such as authoritarianism and dissonance 
avoidance, a new wave of research in social psychology suggests that many of these proclivities 
exist in equal levels in conservatives and liberals. As can be seen in Table 1, these include 
authoritarianism, discrimination, dissonance avoidance, prejudice, selective exposure, and 
resistance to science. For example, although researchers previously thought conservatives were 
more intolerant of dissimilar others, such results may have been due to confounds between the 
target groups investigated by liberal researchers (e.g., African Americans) and the political 
ideology of the target groups (e.g., African Americans tend to be politically liberal). More recent 
work suggests that people exhibit higher intolerance toward groups perceived as more dissimilar 
to their own group, and to similar degrees for liberals and conservatives (Brandt, Reyna, 
Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). 
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Table 1. Recent work demonstrating more symmetry between liberals and conservatives than 
previously believed. 
Domain Claim Reference 
Authoritarianism Left-wing authoritarianism exists, and 
predicts similar outcomes as right-wing 
authoritarianism 
Conway, Houck, Gornick, & 
Repke, 2018 
Discrimination Liberals and conservatives similarly 
endorse more discrimination against 
groups that violate their values than 
groups that do not 
Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 
2013 
Dissonance 
avoidance 
Liberals and conservatives similarly 
avoid writing counter-attitudinal essays 
Collins, Crawford, & Brandt, 
2017 
Prejudice Liberals and conservatives are similarly 
intolerant toward ideologically 
dissimilar and threatening groups 
Brandt et al., 2014 
Resistance to 
science 
Liberals and conservatives have similar 
negative reactions to dissonant science 
communication 
Liberals and conservatives similarly 
deny scientific interpretations of results 
that conflict with their attitudes 
Nisbett, Cooper, & Garrett, 
2015 
 
 
Washburn & Skitka, 2018 
Selective exposure Liberals and conservatives are similarly 
averse to learning the views of 
ideological opponents 
 
Extreme conservatives demonstrate the 
most selective exposure, but moderate 
conservatives demonstrate the least 
Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 
2017 
 
 
Rodriguez, Moskowitz, 
Salem, & Ditto, 2017 
 
 
This does not mean that conservatives and liberals are similar in all ways or that one 
group will never be vastly more biased or incorrect than the other—they will (Federico & Malka, 
2018; Ditto et al., 2019). Groups, as we have argued, are most biased about issues that are 
morally important and ambiguous. The general psychological propensities for bias appear similar 
on the political left and right, but there are predictable domain-specific asymmetries in bias. 
To consider a few examples, conservatives appear more motivated to reject 
anthropogenic climate change than liberals, likely because it seems to support government 
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regulation and more centralization and hurts the fossil fuel industry, an important part of the 
Republican base in the United States (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016). Conservatives may also 
exaggerate the amount of choice people exercise over their sexuality because homosexuality is 
considered immoral by a substantial proportion of the religious believers in the Republican 
coalition (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008), and contending that it is a free decision rather than an 
innate inclination is more compelling for moral condemnation (Clark, Baumeister, & Ditto, 
2017). On the other hand, a growing body of work suggests that liberals in general are more 
biased than conservatives about traditionally conceived disadvantaged groups (e.g. women, 
Blacks; see Table 2), likely because an important moral value of the political left is opposition to 
inequality (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).   
 
Table 2. Recent work documenting a domain-specific bias asymmetry about disadvantaged 
groups such that liberals are more biased than conservatives 
Finding Reference 
All political orientations demonstrate a pro-black bias, but higher 
liberalism was associated with a larger pro-black bias 
Axt, Ebersole, & 
Nosek, 2016 
Liberals were more willing to make a utilitarian sacrifice of a White 
man’s life than of a Black man’s life, whereas race had no influence on 
conservatives’ judgments 
Uhlmann, Pizarro, 
Tannenbaum, & 
Ditto, 2009 
Whereas liberals are more inclined to amplify the successes of 
disadvantaged groups (i.e., Blacks, women) than advantaged groups 
(i.e., Whites, men), conservatives treat the successes of both groups 
more similarly 
Kteily, Rocklage, 
McClanahan, & 
Ho, 2019 
White liberals present less self-competence to Black than White 
interaction partners, whereas White conservatives treat the groups more 
similarly 
Dupree & Fiske, 
2019 
Liberals are biased against the notion that there could be biological 
differences between demographic groups when those differences appear 
to favor advantaged groups, whereas conservatives display less of a bias 
Winegard, Clark, 
Hasty, & 
Baumeister, 2018 
A study from a political bias meta-analysis with the closest relevance to 
disadvantaged groups (affirmative action and same-sex marriage) found 
one of the largest effect sizes for liberal bias (Crawford, Jussim, Cain, & 
Cohen, 2013) 
Ditto et al. (2018) 
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Note that if one group currently has more or stronger concerns (because of historical and 
time variant factors such as rapidly changing demographics or having recently lost a presidential 
election), or if one group has more moral convictions in general, one might predict more bias in 
that group (during that time period, or in general). However, our best current estimate is that 
domain-specific asymmetries between liberals and conservatives appear to produce general 
symmetries in pro-tribe biases among liberals and conservatives when averaged across multiple 
domains (and over at least a brief period of time). Until newer or better information contradicts 
these recent findings, it seems reasonable to posit that liberals and conservatives are roughly 
symmetrical in their pro-tribe cognitive tendencies. 
Conclusion 
 Humans are tribal creatures. They were not designed to reason dispassionately about the 
world; rather, they were designed to reason in ways that promote the interests of their coalition 
(and hence, themselves). It would therefore be surprising if a particular group of individuals did 
not display such tendencies, and recent work suggests, at least in the U.S. political sphere, that 
both liberals and conservatives are substantially biased—and to similar degrees. Historically, and 
perhaps even in modern society, these tribal biases are quite useful for group cohesion but 
perhaps also for other moral purposes (e.g., liberal bias in favor of disadvantaged groups might 
help increase equality). Also, it is worth noting that a bias toward viewing one’s own tribe in a 
favorable light is not necessarily irrational. If one’s goal is to be admired among one’s own tribe, 
fervidly supporting their agenda and promoting their goals, even if that means having or 
promoting erroneous beliefs, is often a reasonable strategy (Kahan et al., 2017). The incentives 
for holding an accurate opinion about global climate change, for example, may not be worth the 
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social rejection and loss of status that could accompany challenging the views of one’s political 
ingroup. 
However, these biases decrease the likelihood of consensus across political divides. Thus, 
developing effective strategies for disincentivizing political tribalism and promoting the much 
less natural but more salutary tendencies toward civil political discourse and reasonable 
compromise are crucial priorities for future research. A useful theoretical starting point is that 
tribalism and concomitant biases are part of human nature, and that no group, not even one’s 
own, is immune. 
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Recommended Readings 
1. Ditto et al., 2018 (see References): A meta-analysis of partisan bias studies (which found 
liberals and conservatives showed an equivalent tendency to evaluate politically congenial 
information more favorably than politically uncongenial information), including a discussion 
of how to reconcile conflicting literature on the question of symmetry in partisan bias. 
2. Eitan et al., 2019 (see References): An article demonstrating the extent to which political 
social psychology research can be affected by liberal viewpoints and values. 
3. Van Bavel and Pereira, 2018 (see References): A comprehensive and topical overview on 
ways in which partisan identity can affect individuals’ cognition, judgments, and decision-
making. 
4. Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slavic, 2017 (see References): An article for understanding how 
motivated reasoning in politics serves to maintain individuals’ standing in important ingroups 
(e.g., based on political identity). 
5. Federico and Malka, 2018 (see References): Example of a review article that challenges the 
notion that conservative ideology is invariably linked with certain psychological dispositions 
and argues instead that the association is often dependent on various factors, such as issue, 
context, and group loyalty. 
View publication stats
